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Ideally, public diplomacy is expected to facilitate mutually beneficial interactions between 
state and nonstate entities in different countries. In diplomacy relationships, however, 
countries often seek unilateral influence over other countries instead of balancing power 
with them. To date, there is a lack of research on publics’ perceptions of such relational 
power dynamics between countries. Thus, this study introduces a new construct, 
perceived power discrepancy, as individuals’ evaluations of the extent of discrepancy 
between two countries in terms of how they act and communicate to balance power with 
each other in their relationship. An online survey among Australian citizens was conducted 
in 2017 (N = 511) regarding the U.S.–Australian relationship. The findings showed that 
perceived power discrepancy has positive associations with perceived economic threat and 
that this threat is positively associated with consumer ethnocentrism. Consumer 
ethnocentrism is positively associated with two behavioral variables: negative word-of-
mouth intention and boycott intention toward products from a counterpart country. 
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Since United States President Donald Trump took power in 2017, the sentiment of “foreigners have 
been taking advantage of America” (Hare, 2020a, para. 9) has been salient among many U.S. citizens. Such 
a nationalistic sentiment has spread to other countries as they, too, have begun to advocate for “self-
centered” diplomacy whereby no concerns are shown for reciprocity or engagement with other countries 
(Hare, 2020a). Australia echoed the “America first” rhetoric with “Australia first” (Anderson, 2017), 
introducing policies that prioritized its own interests. Although these international strategies are not new, 
and “America first” does not mean “America alone” (Karabell, 2017), the promotion of this rhetoric has 
changed foreign publics’ perceptions of the United States and has caused difficulties for the country in 
coordinating with others to resolve global issues (Ziv, Graham, & Cao, 2019). This self-centered diplomacy 
has altered how publics perceive power dynamics between their home countries and foreign countries (e.g., 
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“America first, Australia second”; Lieu, 2017). Publics’ observations and experiences of traditional diplomacy 
contradict the premise of public diplomacy, which promotes dialogue and mutuality (Hare, 2020a, 2020b). 
 
Whereas traditional diplomacy generally refers to the international negotiations between and 
among countries’ representatives who express and defend their countries’ interests (Gilboa, 2001), public 
diplomacy is defined as an instrument used by governments to communicate and build relationships with 
foreign publics (Fitzpatrick, 2007)—it is aimed at winning “the ideological battle for the hearts and minds of 
people around the world” (Gilboa, 2008, p. 55). Like traditional diplomacy, public diplomacy’s primary 
purpose is to advance a country’s own interests and values (Gregory, 2011). Public diplomacy, however, 
achieves its purpose through the strategic efforts to achieve goals that are shared between a country and 
its foreign publics through a two-way street of engagement (Fitzpatrick, 2017). This engagement has been 
coined as a “delusion” because the dialogue it promotes contradicts the promotion of self-interest in foreign 
policy (Comor & Bean, 2012). Hence, Hare (2020b) argues that public diplomacy is “losing its connection 
with wider diplomacy” (p. 153) and that foreign publics are forming contradictory impressions of countries 
as a consequence of the divergence in their traditional and public diplomacy efforts. This prompts the 
research problem that underpins this study: How do publics perceive and react to the balance or imbalance 
in how countries relate to one another in diplomatic relationships? 
 
According to Baldwin (2016), diplomatic relationships are characterized by relational power and 
influence. In international relations, relational power is defined as “the capacity of one actor (individual, a 
group, or a state) to get another actor to do something it would not otherwise do” (Azmanova, 2018, p. 
69). Through interactions, countries may seek to gain power over one another. Therefore, power is not 
merely a property or resource possessed by a country (Baldwin, 2016); rather, it stems from the country’s 
relationships with other countries and guides its choice of strategies to influence other countries through 
hard influence tactics, such as persuasion, or soft influence tactics, such as exchanging favors (e.g., Chong, 
Fu, & Shang, 2013). 
 
Power is a two-edged sword for relationships between and among countries; on the one hand, 
there is a battle for power to influence (“power over”), while on the other, there is a necessity to engage in 
consensus-building (“power with”) for cooperative relations (Berger, 2005). Unequal power relations among 
countries have led to the rise of nationalism, including consumer nationalism (Wang, 2005). In recent years, 
countries have been engaged in an “information war,” seeking to exert communicative influence using 
different media platforms (Szostek, 2020). Diplomats are seen to “speak a language of threats, counter-
campaigns, and unilateral influence when presenting their work to their political masters” (Cull, 2019, p. 
26). Szostek (2020) argues that “more relational” and “diplomatic understandings” (p. 2741) of international 
influence are needed. Chong and colleagues (2013) have also called for more research on relational power, 
especially its effects on different outcomes. 
 
In response to calls for more research on relational power, this study’s aims are threefold. First, it 
aims to provide a reconceptualization of relational power by focusing on the “relationship” and “interactions” 
among countries. This study adopts a relational perspective to consider power as being exercised in the 
interactions between two entities for the mutual construction of a relationship (Bou Zeineddine & Pratto, 
2017). Second, this study aims to empirically test publics’ evaluations of the difference in power dominance 
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or balance by introducing a new construct: perceived power discrepancy. An imbalance of power in the 
relationship can cause perceptions of unfairness among actors who have less power than other actors; this 
impedes the accomplishments of joint gains in the negotiation between actors in the relationship (Wong & 
Howard, 2017). Perceived power discrepancy is defined as individuals’ evaluations of the extent of 
discrepancy among entities in terms of how they exercise tactics of relational power in their relationship, 
such as ensuring fairness and understanding, or dominating and overpowering the other party. Finally, this 
study seeks to contribute to the body of knowledge in public diplomacy and international communication by 
mapping the dynamics of perceived power discrepancy between two countries, consumer attitudes, and 
behavioral intentions. It demonstrates how and why the discrepancy in relational power in diplomatic 
relationships can affect how foreign publics perceive and react to products and brands from the country 
perceived to be dominating another country. 
 
Conceptualizing Perceived Power Discrepancy 
 
Individuals are observers of perceived power discrepancy between countries around the world 
(Robey, 2018). It has been especially prevalent in recent years, when country-sponsored communication 
has focused on fighting an “information war” to influence international publics via the media rather than 
practicing “public diplomacy” to pursue reciprocity in understanding and common interests (Szostek, 2020). 
The success of the information war is measured in terms of one-way influence: changes in opinions, 
attitudes, and behaviors held by foreign publics. Hare (2020b) conveyed a similar concern, as the nature of 
diplomatic engagement has shifted into using communication to strive for more power and influence. Thus, 
there has been growing interest in the effects of power asymmetry in international relations (Baviera, 2015). 
 
In international relations literature, power is, in general, understood in association with coercion 
(Weale, 1976), which refers to the practice of persuading another entity to do something by force or threat. 
It is usually measured in the form of hard power, such as a country’s tangible assets, including military and 
economic resources (Baldwin, 2016). The use of hard power, however, results in perceptions of coercion, 
which contradicts soft power, which encompasses intangible assets, such as a country’s values and culture, 
that result in attraction (Nye, 2011). Nye (2011) defines power as “the ability to affect others to get the 
outcomes one wants” (p. 11) and argues for the importance of differentiating power in relational terms from 
that of resource terms. A country may impose military and economic sanctions on a counterpart country, 
causing tensions between the two and changing the power dynamics in their relationship. Such use of hard 
power could backfire against a country, with the countries being coerced taking an adversarial stance (Nye, 
2011). These power dynamics could result in the organizing or changing of relationships (Bou Zeineddine & 
Pratto, 2017; Partzsch & Fuchs, 2012). There could be detrimental effects when a country seeks to advance 
its own interests at the peril of its allies’ interests; its allies might choose to work more closely with other 
countries, damaging the ties of the alliance or even cutting them (Beeson & Bloomfield, 2019). In contrast, 
relational power is exercised to change behaviors by changing others’ preferences and expectations through 
“the co-optive means of agenda setting, persuasion, and attraction” (Nye, 2011, p. 16). From the 
perspective of the balance of power and balance of threat theories (Paul, 2018; Yetiv, 2006), relational 
power is exercised when a country’s communication and actions are determined based on its consideration 
of another country’s interests and conditions. 
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In spite of the extensive conceptualization of relational power in the literature (e.g., Baldwin, 2016; 
Nye, 2011), there has been a lack of research that conceptualizes and operationalizes power asymmetry 
(Baviera, 2015), international influence (Szostek, 2020), and the balance of power in relational terms 
(Baldwin, 2016) through the lens of publics. The current approach to defining and analyzing power in terms 
of the “balance of tangible assets” is limited in explaining success in outcomes and fails to consider its 
multidimensionality (Baldwin, 2016) and the relational perspective. In a relationship between two entities, 
one’s choice of tactics and behaviors toward another entity is affected by knowledge of symmetry and 
asymmetry in their power dynamics (Wong & Howard, 2017). When there is unequal power distribution 
underlying the relationship, the involved entities may see their expectations of each other violated (Olekalns 
& Smith, 2013). In public relations, control mutuality, which refers to the extent to which a party agrees 
that one party has the rightful power to influence the other in a relationship, is an indicator of relationship 
quality (Hon & Grunig, 1999). Control mutuality can be improved through dialogue because it enables both 
parties in the relationship to have shared control over the determination of relational goals and decisions 
(Sisson, 2017). However, one party may assert unilateral control over the relationship through behaviors 
to dominate decision-making (Stafford & Canary, 1991). According to Kuhn (2008), power is “encoded in 
discursive formations, linguistic distinctions, and material resources” (p. 1229) and can be observed as a 
form of hierarchical relationship in an organization. Power relations would shape the influence of 
communication flows between the involved entities and the perceptions of one entity’s own capacities and 
another entity’s capacities to pursue their interests. In the mutual construction of a relationship, relational 
power is exercised in the interactions between two entities (Bou Zeineddine & Pratto, 2017). 
 
Based on the current conceptualization of relational power, this study is developed with the 
following propositions. First, existing literature has focused on the “relative” comparison of tangible assets 
as power (Baldwin, 2016) instead of focusing on relational dynamics in the interactions among countries. 
Countries make relational efforts to seek to understand each other’s positions for mutually beneficial 
outcomes (e.g., Wong & Howard, 2017). Power is a multidimensional concept and should be understood not 
only as a resource or tangible asset possessed by a country, but also as the dynamic range of tactics and 
behaviors used to relate to another country (Baldwin, 2016; Nye, 2011). Second, relational power originates 
from a relationship and is exercised when an entity chooses a relational strategy, such as collaboration or 
pressure, to influence or relate to another entity (Chong et al., 2013). Power is observed and encoded in 
the interactions (Kuhn, 2008), such as the communication of threats (Simon, 1953). Finally, observations 
of the exercise of relational power between countries affect individuals’ attitudes and behaviors toward those 
countries (Baviera, 2015; Carriere, 2016; Wong & Howard, 2017). Here individuals are powerful players 
who make meanings of social order and valuations of power (Carriere, 2016). When there is a discrepancy 
in the relational power between two countries, individuals may develop hostility toward the country that 
fails to consider the other country’s interests and may change their attitudes and behaviors toward products 
from that country (Amine, 2008). Based on these propositions, this study conceptualizes and empirically 
tests individuals’ evaluations of the differences between how two countries exercise relational power by 
introducing a new construct: perceived power discrepancy. It is defined as individuals’ evaluations of the 
extent of discrepancy between two countries that seek to balance or dominate each other in their relationship 
through relational acts, such as considering each other’s interests (acts of balance) or taking advantage of 
the other party (acts of dominance). 
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Effects of Perceived Power Discrepancy 
 
Perceived Economic Threat 
 
Research in political psychology (e.g., Baviera, 2015; Carriere, 2016) and international marketing 
(Diamantopoulos, Schlegelmilch, & Palihawadana, 2011) has discussed the potential effects of unequal power 
relations on individuals’ perceptions and attitudes. Power differences in bilateral relationships could affect 
perceptions of international trade flows (Gower & Mansfield, 1993) and perceptions of economic threat (W. J. 
Lee, Cheah, Phau, Teah, & Elenein, 2016). Perceived economic threat is defined as individuals’ appraisals of 
potential harm and vulnerability to the counterpart country’s economic power being leveraged against their 
own country and their capacity to address this threat (Matsaganis & Seo, 2014). One possible explanation 
could be perceptions of increased competition between the counterpart country and the individual’s country, 
with the counterpart country’s gains being viewed as their country’s losses (Burhan & van Leeuwen, 2016). As 
a consequence, some individuals choose not to purchase brands from particular countries because of their fear 
of the power and influence on their home country (Fitzpatrick, Kendrick, & Fullerton, 2011; Fullerton, Kendrick, 
Chan, Hamilton, & Kerr, 2007). This behavior is prevalent when individuals sense that there are economic 
threats from another country and that their well-being is under threat by imports from that country (Sharma, 
Shimp, & Shin, 1995). Considering the possible association between the presence of perceived power 
discrepancy and perceptions of economic threat, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
 





Consumers are conscious of the country of origin (COO) of the products they buy. When they perceive 
an increased threat from a country, they may form negative attitudes and resort to engaging in boycotts 
against brands from that country (Hong, Hu, Prieger, & Zhu, 2011). Previous research on COO effects has 
mostly defined them as the effects of a country’s image on the perceptions and evaluations of products from 
that country (White, 2012). Consumers’ receptivity to foreign products is affected by COO (Orbaiz & 
Papadopoulos, 2003). One cause is consumer ethnocentrism, an economic form of ethnocentrism that 
originates from one’s love for one’s own country and fear of losing interests to another country (Sharma et al., 
1995). According to Sharma and associates (1995), the purchase of foreign products is both an economic and 
a moral issue for consumers and reflects personal prejudice against imports. Shimp and Sharma (1987) first 
conceptualized consumer ethnocentrism as a psychosocial construct that reflects individuals’ attachment to 
their own groups (e.g., their home countries) and differentiation from other groups (e.g., foreign countries). 
Although Sharma and colleagues (1995) conceptualized consumer ethnocentrism as a stable trait, De Nisco, 
Massi, and Papadopoulos (2020) found that economic animosity, caused by a country taking advantage of 
another country during a crisis, can influence consumer ethnocentrism. Individuals’ feelings of animosity 
toward certain countries can explain consumer ethnocentrism (Licsandru, Szamosi, & Papadopoulos, 2013). 
After September 11, 2001, perceived fears resulting from the political and economic situations increased U.S. 
consumers’ animosity toward certain countries and negatively affected their purchase intention in relation to 
those countries (W. Lee, Hong, & Lee, 2003). International disputes, in which a country communicates its own 
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position with or without regard to another country’s position, could trigger nationalist emotions and consumer 
activism against products from a counterpart country (Wang, 2006; Wang & Wang, 2007). Hence, the following 
hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H2: Perceived economic threat is positively associated with consumer ethnocentrism against products 
from the counterpart country. 
 
Negative Word-of-Mouth Intention 
 
Consumer ethnocentrism is developed as a result of sociopsychological influences (Sharma et al., 
1995) and can affect behavioral intentions such as word-of-mouth communication (H. M. Lee, Chen, Chen, 
Lo, & Hsu, 2020). When consumers have negative experiences with products or brands, they will engage in 
negative word-of-mouth to inform others of their experiences (Ferguson & Johnston, 2011). Negative word-
of-mouth has a greater effect on consumers’ evaluations than positive word-of-mouth because of negativity 
bias (Christodoulides, Michaelidou, & Argyriou, 2012). When consumers are hostile toward the national 
origin of a product, they are more likely to engage in negative word-of-mouth (H. M. Lee et al., 2020) 
because they are unlikely to want others to purchase products of the same national origin. Based on the 
extant literature on consumers’ word-of-mouth behaviors relating to a product’s COO (e.g., Fong & Burton, 
2008; Murtiasih, Sucherly, & Siringoringo, 2014), this study posits the following hypothesis: 
 
H3: Consumer ethnocentrism is positively associated with negative word-of-mouth intention about 




International marketing research has found that consumer ethnocentrism is associated with 
purchase intentions (Watson & Wright, 2000) toward home country products. Ishii (2009) found that the 
boycott of foreign products reflects nationalistic sentiments and an expression of negative feelings or 
animosity toward foreign countries. Research has established the relationship between animosity and 
boycott intention (Klein, Ettenson, & Morris, 1998). Boycott intention is defined as participants’ willingness 
to boycott (Handelman & Arnold, 1999), which could be understood as individuals’ actions of advocacy or 
opposition to an entity. Together with venting behaviors, boycott intention is a reflection of negative 
consumer reaction (Grappi, Romani, & Bagozzi, 2013). In the political context, it could be an indication of 
political consumerism, which can be understood as a route of citizen influence on politics (Newman & Bartels, 
2011). Consumer actions are critical for creating global change (Stolle & Micheletti, 2013). At the same 
time, negative word-of-mouth about a brand is likely to increase negative behavioral intention toward the 
brand (Wee, Lim, & Lwin, 1995; Wilson, Giebelhausen, & Brady, 2017). Considering the interconnectedness 
between individuals’ attitudes toward imports and consumer actions, the following hypotheses are proposed: 
 
H4: Consumer ethnocentrism is positively associated with boycott intention against products from the 
counterpart country. 
 
H5: Negative word-of-mouth intention is positively associated with boycott intention. 
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Figure 1 shows the proposed model. 
 
 




Development of Measures 
 
A survey was designed to explore the dynamics of the five constructs and the five hypotheses 
and was situated in the context of the Australia–U.S. relationship. The measurement scale of perceived 
power discrepancy was developed based on existing conceptualizations of relational power tactics and 
strategies, such as persuasion, collaboration, and pressure (e.g., Chong et al., 2013), and the pursuit of 
shared decision-making (e.g., Sisson, 2017), based on the premise that two countries in a bilateral 
relationship would engage in such relational efforts by seeking to understand one another and maintaining 
an equal relationship for mutually beneficial outcomes (e.g., Wong & Howard, 2017). A total of 16 items 
were proposed, and a discrepancy score was generated for each item. For example, the score for the item 
“The Australian government has tried its best to understand the positions of USA” was deducted from the 
score for the item “The U.S.A government has tried its best to understand the positions of Australia.” The 
discrepancy score indicates the difference between the two tests, with the score for Australia’s efforts 
being used as the baseline score (Karson, 2020). Griffin, Murray, and Gonzalez (1999) discuss the face 
validity of difference scores in examining discrepancy, and that the difference in scores explains as much 
variance as the two components being analyzed individually. Because the construct of perceived power 
discrepancy measures the congruence or incongruence between two constructs (i.e., relational power 
exercised by Australia vs. the United States), the difference score was deemed appropriate for the 
construct (Edwards, 2001; Karson, 2020). To reduce the measurement error of the difference scores, 
Edwards’ (2001) recommendation of using structural equation modeling (SEM) with latent variables was 
used in the analysis. 
 
Four variables were proposed to examine the effects of perceived power discrepancy. For perceived 
economic threat, a total of three items were proposed based on W. J. Lee and colleagues’ (2016) study. The 
items for measuring consumer ethnocentrism were developed based on Shimp and Sharma’s (1987) study 
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and were adapted to the Australia-versus-U.S. evaluation, with items such as “Australians should always 
buy Australian-made products instead of imports from the USA.” The items of negative word-of-mouth 
intention were developed and adapted from J. N. Kim and Rhee’s (2011) study on communicative behaviors. 
Finally, the items for boycott intention were developed based on Grappi and associates (2013). Respondents 
were asked to respond to the items on a Likert scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). 
 
Data Collection and Demographics 
 
After approval was obtained from the university’s ethics committee, a nationally representative 
sample was obtained via an international research company, Qualtrics, which provided remuneration to 
participants. A total of 511 valid responses were received from Australian citizens in October 2017. The 
quota sample was representative of the age and gender distribution of Australia’s population. Australia was 
selected as a research context because of increased coverage of doubts regarding U.S.–Australian relations 
at the time of data collection, which called for Australia’s reconsideration of how to strategically manage its 
global relationships to ensure that Australia’s interests were not infringed on (Beeson & Bloomfield, 2019; 
Robey, 2018; Thakur, 2016; Tidwell, 2017). 
 
Of the 511 respondents, there were 245 (48%) males, 263 (51%) females, and three respondents 
who did not disclose their gender. The majority of the respondents (73.2%) were Caucasians, followed by 
South Asians (5.3%), East Asians (4.3%), Indigenous peoples, native Americans or Pacific Islanders (1.8%), 
Arab or Middle Eastern peoples (1.8%), and Africans (1.4%). A total of 11.5% of respondents did not 
disclose their ethnicity. Almost a third of respondents had completed a bachelor’s degree or above (32.5%), 
followed by high school (29.2%), some university (21.6%), and less than high school (6.5%). A total of 
10.2% of respondents did not disclose their educational attainment. Regarding age, 6.6% of the respondents 
were aged 18–20 years, 18.2% were aged 21–30, 18.4% were aged 31–40, 14.4% were aged 41–50, 
17.8% were aged 51–60, and 24.6% were 61 or older. 
 
Gender, ethnicity, age, and educational attainment had no association with the five variables 
tested. However, political orientation, which was tested with the item “I consider myself to be politically (a) 
conservative, (b) moderate, (c) liberal, (d) progressive, or (e) other,” was found to be significantly 
associated with boycott intention (F = 2.655, df = 4, p < .05), with a significant mean difference between 
the conservative group (M = 2.09) and the progressive group (M = 2.51). Political orientation was used as 




After reverse-coding the negatively worded survey items (except for the variable “negative word-
of-mouth intention”), exploratory factor analysis (EFA) with maximum likelihood and promax rotation was 
conducted for the five variables using SPSS Version 26. Initially, 16 survey items were proposed for 
perceived power discrepancy. The EFA indicated that there were two dimensions and that nine items should 
be retained. The decision for item removal and item retention was made based on Williams, Onsman, and 
Brown’s (2010) guidelines that there must be at least two items loading on the same factor and that the 
items should display high loadings on one factor only. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of adequacy 
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was .87, and the Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant, showing that the selected factor structure was 
adequate (Howard, 2016). The items accounted for 66% of the total variance, which is considered acceptable 
for the social sciences (Maskey, Fei, & Nguyen, 2018). Subsequently, confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) 
was conducted on the selected factor structure. The nine items retained for perceived power discrepancy 
had factor loadings ranging from .64 to .83. The items loaded on two factors: One factor was made up of 
items that were positively worded (reflecting a discrepancy in relational balance), and the other was made 
up of items that were negatively worded and reverse-coded (reflecting a discrepancy in relational 
dominance). Model fit for the measurement model (χ2 = 32.16, df = 21, χ2/df = 1.531, p = .056, 
comparative fit index [CFI] = .99, root mean square error of approximation [RMSEA] = .032, standardized 
root mean square residual [SRMR] = .0201) met Hu and Bentler’s (1999) cutoff criteria for fit indices (χ2/df 
< 3, CFI > .95, RMSEA < .06, SRMR < .08). Although it is generally believed that EFA and CFA should be 
conducted on two separate data sets, Worthington and Whittaker (2006) argue that the single use of either 
EFA or CFA has little advantage over the combined use of both EFA and CFA on the same data set. Rather 
than using a second data set for CFA, “the most logical approach would be to conduct an EFA followed by a 
CFA in all cases” (Worthington & Whittaker, 2006, p. 815). 
 
Following Worthington and Whittaker’s (2006) recommendation that the factor structure of all 
instruments should be validated using EFA before CFA or SEM to ensure the validity of the variables for the 
research context, EFA with maximum likelihood and promax rotation was also conducted for other variables. 
Survey items with low factor loadings on a single factor or with cross-loadings on multiple factors were 
removed (Yong & Pearce, 2013). For perceived economic threat, one item was removed, resulting in two 
items being retained with factor loadings of .85 and .89, respectively. Although it is ideal to retain a minimum 
of three items to explain a latent variable, it is necessary to examine the item loadings from the factor 
analysis and remove items to maximize convergent and discriminant validity (Raubenheimer, 2004). The 
item that was removed had an item loading of .336 and reduced the Cronbach’s alpha from α = .862 to α 
= .695. According to Gosling, Rentfrow, and Swann (2003), using more items can bolster internal 
consistency because of the overlapping content of the items; however, using fewer items can reduce item 
redundancy. For consumer ethnocentrism, 11 items were initially proposed, and two were removed, 
resulting in nine items loading on two factors. One factor consisted of items that reflected respondents’ 
preferences for Australian products over U.S. products, and the other consisted of items that reflected 
preference against U.S. products in the Australian market. The selected factor structure was adequate, with 
a KMO measure of .890 and a significant Bartlett’s test of sphericity. The items accounted for 70% of the 
variance, and the items had factor loadings ranging from .61 to .85. Six items were proposed for negative 
word-of-mouth intention, and one was removed. The retained factor structure explained 63% of the variance 
with factor loadings ranging from .74 to .86. The KMO measure was .858, and the Bartlett’s test of sphericity 
was significant. Finally, all five items for boycott intention were retained with factor loadings ranging from 
.78 to .91, explaining 80% of the variance and resulting in an adequate KMO measure (.888) and a 
significant Bartlett’s test of sphericity. 
 
Table 1 indicates the factor loading, the mean, standard deviation, and standard error of the mean 
for each survey item. The Cronbach’s alpha (α) for each variable is shown as an indicator of reliability. 
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Table 1. Factor Loadings, Mean, Standard Deviation, and Standard Error of the Mean for Each 
Survey Item.  
Variable Survey Item 
Factor 








α = .795 
The [Australian/USA] government seeks to 
maintain an equal relationship with 
[Australia/USA]. 
.56 .88 1.29 .057 
The [Australian/USA] government ensures 
that it acts fairly with [Australia/USA].  
.62 .81 1,13 .050 
The [Australian/USA] government has tried 
its best to achieve mutually beneficial 
outcomes with [Australia/USA].  
.81 .66 1.15 .051 
The [Australian/USA] government has tried 
its best to understand the positions of 
[Australia/USA].  








α = .884 
The [Australian/USA] government ignores 
opinions of [Australia/USA]. (reverse) 
.75 .89 1.50 .066 
The [Australian/USA] government seeks to 
take advantage of [Australia/USA]. 
(reverse) 
.74 .76 1.47 .065 
The [Australian/USA] government 
dominates [Australia/USA]. (reverse) 
.88 1.41 1.78 .079 
The [Australian/USA] government only 
cares about its own interests rather than the 
interests of [Australia/USA]. (reverse) 
.74 .93 1.56 .069 
The [Australian/USA] government 
overpowers [Australia/USA]. (reverse) 




α = .862 
Some economic problems in Australia are 
caused by excessive competition from the 
USA. 
.85 3.41 .949 .042 
Economy in Australia has suffered from the 
impact of competition from the USA. 







α = .847 
Australians should always buy Australian-
made products instead of imports from the 
USA. 
.61 3.86 1.01 .045 
Only those products that are unavailable in 
Australia should be imported from the USA. 
.78 3.66 1.08 .048 
We should purchase products manufactured 
in Australia instead of letting the USA get 
rich off us. 
.75 3.69 1.07 .047 
We should buy from the USA only products 
that we cannot obtain within our own 
country. 
.85 3.4 1.17 .052 








α = .891 
Purchasing USA-made products is un-
Australian. 
.76 2.94 1.18 .052 
It is not right to purchase foreign products 
from the USA. 
.79 2.74 1.17 .052 
Restrictions should be put on all imports 
from the USA. 
.81 2.89 1.19 .053 
USA companies should not be allowed to put 
their products on our markets. 
.80 2.63 1.15 .051 
USA products should be taxed heavily to 
reduce their entry into Australia. 





α = .903 
I am likely to share negative comments 
about products from the USA with my family 
and friends. 
.74 2.78 1.01 .045 
I am likely to write negative comments 
about products from the USA on social 
media. 
.81 2.43 1.07 .047 
I am likely to forward negative news stories 
about products from the USA to others. 
.86 2.54 1.05 .047 
I am likely to express agreement with 
people who have negative opinions about 
products from the USA. 
.82 2.70 .99 .044 
I am likely to express agreement with 
people who criticize products from the USA. 




α = .937 
I want to boycott USA products in order to 
bring about changes in the conduct of the 
USA. 
.78 2.57 1.142 .051 
I want to participate in e-mail campaign 
against USA products in order to bring 
about changes in the conduct of the USA. 
.88 2.36 1.097 .049 
I want to participate in picketing against 
USA products in order to bring about 
changes in the conduct of the USA. 
.88 2.23 1.102 .049 
I want to participate in collective 
movements against USA products in order 
to bring about changes in the conduct of the 
USA. 
.91 2.33 1.114 .049 
I want to participate in demonstration 
against USA products in order to bring 
about changes in the conduct of the USA. 
.88 2.25 1.101 .049 
Note. α = Cronbach’s Alpha. M = Mean. SD = Standard Deviation. SE = Standard Error. 
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SEM was performed using AMOS (Version 26) to test the fit of the hypothesized model to the data. 
SEM was used because of its capabilities to test hypotheses of unobserved variables represented by 
observed survey items and to recognize error terms (Kline, 2013). Table 2 shows the convergent validity 
and average variance extracted (AVE) as an indicator of discriminant validity.  
 





AVE values (in bold) and correlations 












.607 .547 .779      
Perceived Economic 
Threat (PET) 










U.S. products) (CE2) 




.654 −.061 −.067 .263 .139 .415 .809  
Boycott Intention (BI) .753 −.105 −.209 .364 .219 .577 .501 .868 
 
Convergent validity, which refers to the extent to which different measures capture a common construct, 
was above the minimum requirement of .50 for all variables (Carlson & Herdman, 2012). Discriminant 
validity, which ensures that a construct measure is unique and reflects the phenomenon of interest, also 
meets the requirements of having an AVE that is higher than the square correlations of the constructs 








The hypothesized model resulted in a satisfactory model fit (χ2 = 1184.3, df = 420, χ2/df = 2.820, p 
= <.001, CFI = .923, RMSEA = .060, SRMR = .0782) based on Hu and Bentler’s (1999) cutoff criteria for fit 





Figure 2. Final model. 
 
According to the model, perceived power discrepancy has two factors—discrepancy in relational 
balance and dominance—and is positively associated with perceived economic threat (H1) (β = .147, p < 
.05). The positive relationship between perceived economic threat and consumer ethnocentrism is significant 
(β = .358, p < .001). Consumer ethnocentrism has a positive relationship with negative word-of-mouth 
intention (H3) (β = .386, p < .001) and boycott intention (H4) (β = .290, p < .001). Additionally, a positive 
relationship was found between negative word-of-mouth intention and boycott intention (H5) (β = .460, p 
< .001). Political orientation had a significant relationship with boycott intention (β = .104, p < .01) and 







Model fit indices: 
χ2 (df = 420) = 1184.300 
χ2/df = 2.820 (p = .000) 
CFI = .923 
RMSEA = .060 
SRMR = .0782 
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001 






This study was conducted based on the reconceptualization of relational power, drawing on extant 
literature in international relations (e.g., Baldwin, 2016; Nye, 2011) in which the concept of relational power 
has been conceptualized, but not operationalized (e.g., Baldwin, 2016; Baviera, 2015; Szostek, 2020). The 
construct of perceived power discrepancy was developed based on the premise that countries make 
relational efforts to seek to understand each other’s positions for a relationship that results in mutually 
beneficial outcomes (e.g., Wong & Howard, 2017). Such relational efforts are exercised and observed 
through countries’ communicative acts, and power disparity (named “perceived power discrepancy” in this 
study) is observed, interpreted, and evaluated by individuals. 
 
Research on negotiation has identified power relations as a complex and dynamic process whereby 
perceived power could affect power-related behaviors (P. H. Kim, Pinkley, & Fragale, 2005). Against this 
backdrop, this study conceptualizes and operationalizes perceived power discrepancy as individuals’ 
evaluations of the extent of discrepancy between two entities in terms of how they relate to each other 
through power tactics, such as persuasion, collaboration, and pressure, in their interactions (e.g., Chong et 
al., 2013). It found that high perceived power discrepancy is positively associated with perceived economic 
threat, in line with claims in the extant literature associating power with the communication of threats (Mead 
& Filson, 2017). At the same time, perceived economic threat is directly associated with consumer 
ethnocentrism, which is positively related to negative word-of-mouth intention and boycott intention. 
Negative word-of-mouth intention also has a positive association with boycott intention. This is in line with 
current research on how individuals speak negatively about products of a certain COO as an expression of 
their negative sentiments toward international political events (Fong & Burton, 2008). This study extends 
research on COO effects by demonstrating the significance of publics’ evaluations of international influence 




The use of power is not without cost. More importantly, the lack of balance in relational power 
could be costly. This is particularly the case when the acts that are enacted to exercise power cause 
disadvantages to the other party (Baldwin, 2016) as one side seeks to prioritize its own interests over the 
other’s (Hare, 2020a). The relational perspective on power indicates to countries that although they can 
invest in public diplomacy initiatives to ideally empower foreign publics and to incorporate their voices into 
decision-making (Zhang, 2013), foreign publics can also evaluate the power dynamics that exist between 
their home country and counterpart countries. On the one hand, countries can invest in public diplomacy 
efforts to invite foreign publics to engage in dialogue with them (Comor & Bean, 2012); conversely, they 
may not wish to engage with them because they have concerns about their home country’s political 
relationships with these countries (Storie, 2015) and could be adversarial publics against those countries 
(Zaharna & Uysal, 2016). As found in this study, publics who identify a discrepancy in how one country 
relates to another perceive economic threats and hold negative attitudes and behavioral intentions toward 
products from the counterpart country. 
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While dominant power relations exist in international relations, Hare (2020b) notes that diplomatic 
actors have become engaged in “the battle of power in a network society” as they have also diverged from 
consensus-building, which is the core of public diplomacy, into self-promotion (p. 161). The soft power 
(resulting from public diplomacy practices) has transformed from being the power to attract, by seeking a 
balance in promoting mutual interests in bilateral relationships, into the power to influence, by advancing one’s 
interests at the expense of another country’s interests (Hare, 2020a). In fact, in official diplomatic relationships 
in which countries’ representatives are supposed to interact to relate to one another in order to achieve 
mutually beneficial outcomes, the same dynamics exist where they seek to understand each other’s position 
while also exerting their own interests through communicative acts. Individuals, as observers of these 
communicative acts, then make evaluations of these dynamics and react to them attitudinally and behaviorally. 




This study conceptualizes perceived power discrepancy with the proposition that power should be 
understood in relational terms and is observed and encoded in the interactions between two entities. Power 
in relational terms—demonstrated through communicative acts to pursue understanding and mutually 
beneficial outcomes—is significant to bilateral relationships between countries. This study found that when 
there is a discrepancy in relational power (such that Australia is considered to be trying to balance power 
with the United States, rather than the United States with Australia, through communicative acts such as 
trying to understand the other party’s position), Australians will demonstrate more negative attitudes and 
behavioral intentions toward U.S. products. 
 
Limitations and Future Directions 
 
Further research should be conducted to validate the findings of this study. Although the survey 
items were developed based on existing conceptualizations in international relations (e.g., Baldwin, 2016) 
and negotiation (e.g., Wong & Howard, 2017), replication studies are needed to test their applicability to 
bilateral relationships between other countries. Although ethnicity did not have significant associations with 
any variables, future research should consider exploring its possible effects with a sample representative of 
ethnicity. Future studies may consider studying the confluence between power in terms of tangible assets 
(e.g., economic power) and power in relational terms (e.g., communicative acts) in affecting perceptions. 
Other causes of perceived power discrepancy, such as nationalism (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989) and anti-
American sentiment (Fullerton et al., 2007), should be examined. Future research could also consider 
examining the model from a different perspective, such as international marketing, and what communicative 





Amine, L. S. (2008). Country-of-origin, animosity and consumer response: Marketing implications of anti-
Americanism and Francophobia. International Business Review, 17(4), 402–422. 
doi:10.1016/j.ibusrev.2008.02.013 
16  Lisa Tam and Soojin Kim International Journal of Communication 15(2021) 
 
Anderson, S. (2017, April 19). Malcolm Turnbull echoes Donald Trump with “Australia first” rhetoric on 
scrapping of 457 visa. ABC News. Retrieved from https://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-04-
19/turnbull-echoes-trump-with-australia-first-rhetoric-on-457-visa/8453794 
 
Azmanova, A. (2018). Relational, structural and systemic forms of power: The “right to justification” 
confronting three types of domination. Journal of Political Power, 11(1), 68–78. 
doi:10.1080/2158379X.2018.1433757 
 
Baldwin, D. A. (2016). Power and international relations: A conceptual approach. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
 
Baviera, A. S. P. (2015). Power and international relations. Asian Politics and Policy, 7(3), 345–346. 
doi:10.1111/aspp.12205 
 
Beeson, M., & Bloomfield, A. (2019). The Trump effect downunder: U.S. allies, Australian strategic culture, 
and the politics of path dependence. Contemporary Security Policy, 40(3), 335–361. 
doi:10.1080/13523260.2019.1594534 
 
Berger, B. K. (2005). Power over, power with, and power to relations: Critical reflections on public 
relations, the dominant coalition, and activism. Journal of Public Relations Research, 17(1), 5–28. 
doi:10.1207/s1532754xjprr1701_3 
 
Bou Zeineddine, F., & Pratto, F. (2017). The need for power and the power of need: An ecological 
approach for political psychology. Political Psychology, 38(S1), 3–35. doi:10.1111/pops.12389 
 
Burhan, O. K., & van Leeuwen, E. (2016). Altering perceived cultural and economic threats can increase 
immigrant helping. Journal of Social Issues, 72(3), 548–565. doi:10.1111/josi.12181 
 
Carlson, K. D., & Herdman, A. O. (2012). Understanding the impact of convergent validity on research 
results. Organizational Research Methods, 15(1), 17–32. doi:10.1177/1094428110392383 
 
Carriere, K. R. (2016). The pervasive power of political positioning: A review of Culture & Political 
Psychology. Culture and Psychology, 22(1), 158–165. doi:10.1177/1354067X15623068 
 
Chong, M. P. M., Fu, P. P., & Shang, Y. F. (2013). Relational power and influence strategies: A step further 
in understanding power dynamics. Chinese Management Studies, 7(1), 53–73. 
doi:10.1108/17506141311307596 
 
Christodoulides, G., Michaelidou, N., & Argyriou, E. (2012). Cross-national differences in e-WOM influence. 
European Journal of Marketing, 46(11), 1689–1707. doi:10.1108/03090561211260040 
 
Comor, E., & Bean, H. (2012). America’s “engagement” delusion: Critiquing a public diplomacy consensus. 
International Communication Gazette, 74(3), 203–220. doi:10.1177/1748048511432603 
International Journal of Communication 15(2021)  What Is the Power of Balancing Power?  17 
 
Cull, N. J. (2019). Public diplomacy: Foundations for global engagement in the digital age. Cambridge, UK: 
Polity Press. 
 
De Nisco, A., Massi, M., & Papadopoulos, N. (2020). Partners or foes? Cross-country consumer animosity, 
ethnocentrism, nationalism in times of international crisis. Journal of Global Marketing, 33(3), 
207–222. doi:10.1080/08911762.2020.1744209 
 
Diamantopoulos, A., Schlegelmilch, B., & Palihawadana, D. (2011). The relationship between country-of-
origin image and brand image as drivers of purchase intentions: A test of alternative 
perspectives. International Marketing Review, 28(5), 508–524. 
doi:10.1108/02651331111167624 
 
Edwards, J. R. (2001). Ten difference score myths. Organizational Research Methods, 4(3), 265–287. 
doi:10.1177/109442810143005 
 
Ferguson, J. L., & Johnston, W. J. (2011). Customer response to dissatisfaction: A synthesis of literature 
and conceptual framework. Industrial Marketing Management, 40(1), 118–127. 
doi:10.1016/j.indmarman.2010.05.002 
 
Fitzpatrick, K. R. (2007). Advancing the new public diplomacy: A public relations perspective. The Hague 
Journal of Diplomacy, 2(3), 187–211. doi:10.1163/187119007X240497 
 
Fitzpatrick, K. R. (2017). Public diplomacy in the public interest. Journal of Public Interest 
Communications, 1(1), 78–93. 
 
Fitzpatrick, K. R., Kendrick, A., & Fullerton, J. (2011). Factors contributing to anti-Americanism among 
people abroad: A retrospective view from the frontlines of U.S. public diplomacy. International 
Journal of Strategic Communication, 5(3), 154–170. doi:10.1080/1553118X.2010.549816 
 
Fong, J., & Burton, S. (2008). A cross-cultural comparison of electronic word-of-mouth and country-of-
origin effects. Journal of Business Research, 61(3), 233–242. doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2007.06.015 
 
Fullerton, J. A., Kendrick, A., Chan, K., Hamilton, M., & Kerr, G. (2007). Attitudes towards American 
brands and Brand America. Place Branding and Public Diplomacy, 3(3), 205–212. 
doi:10.1057/palgrave.pb.6000063 
 
Gilboa, E. (2001). Diplomacy in the media age: Three models of uses and effects. Diplomacy & Statecraft, 
12(2), 1–28. doi:10.1080/09592290108406201 
 
Gilboa, E. (2008). Searching for a theory of public diplomacy. Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science, 616(1), 55–77. doi:10.1177/0002716207312142 
 
18  Lisa Tam and Soojin Kim International Journal of Communication 15(2021) 
 
Gosling, S. D., Rentfrow, P. J., & Swann, W. B. (2003). A very brief measure of the Big-Five personality 
domains. Journal of Research in Personality, 37(6), 504–528. doi:10.1016/S0092-
6566(03)00046-1 
 
Gower, J., & Mansfield, E. D. (1993). Power politics and international trade. American Political Science 
Review, 87(2), 408–420. doi:10.2307/2939050 
 
Grappi, S., Romani, S., & Bagozzi, R. P. (2013). Consumer response to corporate irresponsible behavior: 
Moral emotions and virtues. Journal of Business Research, 66(10), 1814–1821. 
doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2013.02.002 
 
Gregory, B. (2011). American public diplomacy: Enduring characteristics, elusive transformation. The 
Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 6(3), 351–372. doi:10.1163/187119111X583941 
 
Griffin, D., Murray, S., & Gonzalez, R. (1999). Difference score correlations in relationship research: A 
conceptual primer. Personal Relationships, 6(4), 505–518. doi:10.1111/j.1475-
6811.1999.tb00206.x 
 
Handelman, J. M., & Arnold, S. J. (1999). The role of marketing actions with a social dimension: Appeals 
to the institutional environment. Journal of Marketing, 63(3), 33–48. doi:10.2307/1251774 
 
Hare, P. W. (2020a, February 18). Public diplomacy and soft power? No thanks, it’s America first. CPD 
Blog. Retrieved from https://www.uscpublicdiplomacy.org/blog/public-diplomacy-and-soft-power-
no-thanks-its-america-first 
 
Hare, P. W. (2020b). Corroding consensus-building: How self-centered public diplomacy is damaging 
diplomacy and what can be done about it. Place Branding and Public Diplomacy, 16(2), 153–164. 
doi:10.1057/s41254-019-00137-3 
 
Henseler, J., Ringle, C. M., & Sarstedt, M. (2014). A new criterion for assessing discriminant validity in 
variance-based structural equation modeling. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 
43(1), 115–135. doi:10.1007/s11747-014-0403-8 
 
Hon, L. C., & Grunig, J. E. (1999). Guidelines for measuring relationships in public relations. Retrieved 
from Institute for Public Relations website: https://www.instituteforpr.org/wp-
content/uploads/Guidelines_Measuring_Relationships.pdf 
 
Hong, C., Hu, W. M., Prieger, J. E., & Zhu, D. (2011). French automobiles and the Chinese boycotts of 
2008: Politics really does affect commerce. The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 11(1). 
doi:10.2202/1935-1682.2681 
 
International Journal of Communication 15(2021)  What Is the Power of Balancing Power?  19 
 
Howard, M. C. (2016). A review of exploratory factor analysis decisions and overview of current practices: 
What are we doing and how can we improve? International Journal of Human-Computer 
Interaction, 32(1), 51–62. doi:10.1080/10447318.2015.1087664 
 
Hu, L. T., & Bentler, P. M. (1999). Cutoff criteria for fit indexes in covariance structure analysis: 
Conventional criteria versus new alternatives. Structural Equation Modeling: A Multidisciplinary 
Journal, 6(1), 1–55. doi:10.1080/10705519909540118 
 
Ishii, K. (2009). Nationalistic sentiments of Chinese consumers: The effects and determinants of animosity 
and consumer ethnocentrism. Journal of International Consumer Marketing, 21(4), 299–308. 
doi:10.1080/08961530802282232 
 
Karabell, Z. (2017, June 2). We’ve always been America first: Donald Trump is just ripping off the mask. 




Karson, M. (2020). Difference score. In N. J. Salkind (Ed.), Encyclopedia of measurement and statistics 
(Vol. 1, pp. 258–260). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications. 
doi:10.4135/9781412952644.n135 
 
Kim, J. N., & Rhee, Y. (2011). Strategic thinking about employee communication behavior (ECB) in public 
relations: Testing the models of megaphoning and scouting effects in Korea. Journal of Public 
Relations Research, 23(3), 243–268. doi:10.1080/1062726X.2011.582204 
 
Kim, P. H., Pinkley, R. L., & Fragale, A. R. (2005). Power dynamics in negotiation. The Academy of 
Management Review, 30(4), 799–822. doi:10.5465/amr.2005.18378879 
 
Klein, J. G., Ettenson, R., & Morris, M. D. (1998). The animosity model of foreign product purchase: An 
empirical test in the People’s Republic of China. Journal of Marketing, 62(1), 89–100. 
doi:10.2307/1251805 
 
Kline, R. B. (2013). Principles and practice of structural equation modeling (3rd ed.). New York, NY: The 
Guilford Press. 
 
Kosterman, R., & Feshbach, S. (1989). Toward a measure of patriotic and nationalistic attitudes. Political 
Psychology, 10(2), 257–274. doi:10.2307/3791647 
 
Kuhn, T. (2008). A communicative theory of the firm: Developing an alternative perspective on intra-
organizational power and stakeholder relationships. Organization Studies, 29(8–9), 1227–1254. 
doi:10.1177/0170840608094778 
 
20  Lisa Tam and Soojin Kim International Journal of Communication 15(2021) 
 
Lee, H. M., Chen, T., Chen, Y. S., Lo, W. Y., & Hsu, Y. H. (2020). The effects of consumer ethnocentrism 
and consumer animosity on perceived betrayal and negative word-of-mouth. Asia Pacific Journal 
of Marketing and Logistics. Advance online publication. doi:10.1108/APJML-08-2019-0518 
 
Lee, W., Hong, J., & Lee, S. (2003). Communicating with American consumers in the post 9/11 climate: 
An empirical investigation of consumer ethnocentrism in the United States. International Journal 
of Advertising, 22(4), 487–510. doi:10.1080/02650487.2003.11072865 
 
Lee, W. J., Cheah, I., Phau, I., Teah, M., & Elenein, B. A. (2016). Conceptualising consumer 
regiocentrism: Examining consumers’ willingness to buy products from their own region. Journal 
of Retailing and Consumer Services, 32, 78–85. doi:10.1016/j.jretconser.2016.05.013 
 
Licsandru, T., Szamosi, L. T., & Papadopoulos, N. (2013). The impact of country-of-origin, ethnocentrism 
and animosity on product evaluation: Evidence from Romania. Management Dynamics in the 
Knowledge Economy, 1(2), 259–277. 
 
Lieu, J. (2017). Forget Europe: It’s all about America first, Australia second now. Mashable Australia. 
Retrieved from https://mashable.com/2017/02/08/america-first-australia-second-the-weekly/ 
 
Maskey, R., Fei, J., & Nguyen, H. O. (2018). Use of exploratory factor analysis in maritime research. Asian 
Journal of Shipping and Logistics, 34(2), 91–111. doi:10.1016/j.ajsl.2018.06.006 
 
Matsaganis, M. D., & Seo, M. (2014). Stress in the aftermath of the economic crisis in urban communities: 
The interplay of media use, perceived economic threat, and community belonging. 
Communication Research Reports, 31(4), 303–315. doi:10.1080/08824096.2014.924340 
 
Mead, S., & Filson, B. (2017). Mutuality and shared power as an alternative to coercion and force. Mental 
Health and Social Inclusion, 21(3), 144–152. doi:10.1108/MHSI-03-2017-0011 
 
Murtiasih, S., Sucherly, S., & Siringoringo, H. (2014). Impact of country of origin and word of mouth on 
brand equity. Marketing Intelligence and Planning, 32(5), 616–629. doi:10.1108/MIP-04-2013-0073 
 
Newman, B. J., & Bartels, B. L. (2011). Politics at the checkout line: Explaining political consumerism in 
the United States. Political Research Quarterly, 64(4), 803–817. 
doi:10.1177/1065912910379232 
 
Nye, J. S. (2011). Power and foreign policy. Journal of Political Power, 4(1), 9–24. 
doi:10.1080/2158379X.2011.555960 
 
Olekalns, M., & Smith, P. L. (2013). Dyadic power profiles: Power-contingent strategies for value creation 
in negotiation. Human Communication Research, 39(1), 3–20. doi:10.1111/j.1468-
2958.2012.01440.x 
 
International Journal of Communication 15(2021)  What Is the Power of Balancing Power?  21 
 
Orbaiz, L. V., & Papadopoulos, N. (2003). Toward a model of consumer receptivity of foreign and domestic 
products. Journal of International Consumer Marketing, 15(3), 101–126. 
doi:10.1300/J046v15n03_06 
 
Partzsch, L., & Fuchs, D. (2012). Philanthropy: Power with in international relations. Journal of Political 
Power, 5(3), 359–376. doi:10.1080/2158379X.2012.735114 
 
Paul, T. V. (2018). Restraining great powers: Soft balancing from empires to the global era. New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press. 
 
Raubenheimer, J. (2004). An item selection procedure to maximise scale reliability and validity. SA Journal 
of Industrial Psychology, 30(4), 59–64. doi:10.4102/sajip.v30i4.168 
 
Robey, M. J. (2018, August 24). Observing power discrepancy across the world. Retrieved from 
https://www.psychicgr.com/post/2018/08/23/observing-power-discrepancy-across-the-world 
 
Sharma, S., Shimp, T. A., & Shin, J. (1995). Consumer ethnocentrism: A test of antecedents and 
moderators. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 23(1), 26–37. 
doi:10.1007/BF02894609 
 
Shimp, T. A., & Sharma, S. (1987). Consumer ethnocentrism: Construction and validation of the 
CETSCALE. Journal of Marketing Research, 24(3), 280–289. doi:10.2307/3151638 
 
Simon, H. A. (1953). Notes on the observation and measurement of political power. The Journal of 
Politics, 15(4), 500–516. doi:10.2307/2126538 
 
Sisson, D. C. (2017). Control mutuality, social media, and organization-public relationships: A study of 
local animal welfare organizations’ donors. Public Relations Review, 43(1), 179–189. 
doi:10.1016/j.pubrev.2016.10.007 
 
Stafford, L., & Canary, D. J. (1991). Maintenance strategies and romantic relationship type, gender, and 
relational characteristics. Journal of Social and Personal Relationships, 8(2), 217–242. 
doi:10.1177/0265407591082004 
 
Stolle, D., & Micheletti, M. (2013). Political consumerism. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Storie, L. K. (2015). Lost publics in public diplomacy: Antecedents for online relationship management. 
Public Relations Review, 41(2), 315–317. doi:10.1016/j.pubrev.2015.02.008 
 
Szostek, J. (2020). What happens to public diplomacy during information war? Critical reflections on the 
conceptual framing of international communication. International Journal of Communication, 14, 
2728–2748. 
 
22  Lisa Tam and Soojin Kim International Journal of Communication 15(2021) 
 
Thakur, R. (2016, December 7). The Trump effect and Australia. Australian Outlook. Retrieved from 
http://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/the-trump-effect-and-australia/ 
 
Tidwell, A. (2017). The role of “diplomatic lobbying” in shaping U.S. foreign policy and its effects on the 
Australia-U.S. relationship. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 71(2), 184–200. 
doi:10.1080/10357718.2016.1184620 
 
Wang, J. (2005). Consumer nationalism and corporate reputation management in the global era. 
Corporate Communications: An International Journal, 10(3), 223–239. 
doi:10.1108/13563280510614483 
 
Wang, J. (2006). Public diplomacy and global business. Journal of Business Strategy, 27(3), 41–49. 
doi:10.1108/02756660610663826 
 
Wang, J., & Wang, Z. (2007). The political symbolism of business: Exploring consumer nationalism and its 
implications for corporate reputation management in China. Journal of Communication 
Management, 11(2), 134–149. doi:10.1108/13632540710747361 
 
Watson, J. J., & Wright, K. (2000). Consumer ethnocentrism and attitudes toward domestic and foreign 
products. European Journal of Marketing, 34(9/10), 1149–1166. 
doi:10.1108/03090560010342520 
 
Weale, A. (1976). Power inequalities. Theory and Decision, 7, 297–313. doi:10.1007/BF00135083 
 
Wee, C. H., Lim, S. L., & Lwin, M. (1995). Word-of-mouth communication in Singapore: With focus on 
effects of message-sidedness, source, and user-type. Asia Pacific Journal of Marketing and 
Logistics, 7(1–2), 5–36. doi:10.1108/eb010260 
 
White, C. L. (2012). Brands and national image: An exploration of inverse country-of-origin effect. Place 
Branding and Public Diplomacy, 8(2), 110–118. doi:10.1057/pb.2012.6 
 
Williams, B., Onsman, A., & Brown, T. (2010). Exploratory factor analysis: A five-step guide for novices. 
Australasian Journal of Paramedicine, 8(3), 116–131. doi:10.33151/ajp.8.3.93 
 
Wilson, A. E., Giebelhausen, M. D., & Brady, M. K. (2017). Negative word of mouth can be a positive for 
consumers connected to the brand. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 45(4), 534–
547. doi:10.1007/s11747-017-0515-z 
 
Wong, R. S., & Howard, S. (2017). Blinded by power: Untangling mixed results regarding power and efficiency 
in negotiation. Group Decision and Negotiation, 26(2), 215–245. doi:10.1007/s10726-016-9495-5 
 
International Journal of Communication 15(2021)  What Is the Power of Balancing Power?  23 
 
Worthington, R. L., & Whittaker, T. A. (2006). Scale development research: A content analysis and 
recommendations for best practices. The Counseling Psychologist, 34(6), 806–838. 
doi:10.1177/0011000006288127 
 
Yetiv, S. (2006). The travails of balance of power theory: The United States in the Middle East. Security 
Studies, 15(1), 70–105. doi:10.1080/09636410600666279 
 
Yong, A. G., & Pearce, S. (2013). A beginner’s guide to factor analysis: Focusing on exploratory factor 
analysis. Tutorials in Quantitative Methods for Psychology, 9(2), 79–94. 
doi:10.20982/tqmp.09.2.p079 
 
Zaharna, R. S., & Uysal, N. (2016). Going for the jugular in public diplomacy: How adversarial publics 
using social media are challenging state legitimacy. Public Relations Review, 42(1), 109–119. 
doi:10.1016/j.pubrev.2015.07.006 
 
Zhang, J. (2013). A strategic issue management (SIM) approach to social media use in public diplomacy. 
American Behavioral Scientist, 57(9), 1312–1331. doi:10.1177/0002764213487734 
 
Ziv, R., Graham, A., & Cao, L. (2019). America first? Trump, crime, and justice internationally. Victims 
and Offenders, 14(8), 997–1009. doi:10.1080/15564886.2019.1671291 
